On the Trade off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and the Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee
证明任何激励相容且个体理性的市场机制都难以同时避免赤字和无效率，并引入固定交易费的双重拍卖机制，通过调整费用大小实现任意赤字或盈余水平，且达到理论最优边界。
In many trading environments, any incentive compatible and individually rational market mechanism will be either inefficient or will run a deficit. We prove that as the market size m gets large, for any fixed surplus (or deficit) x, m times the minimal absolute inefficiency converges to c(x) where c( ⋅ ) is essentially a quadratic function of textitx. We introduce a new mechanism, the double auction with a fixed transaction fee. By choosing the size of the fee appropriately, any level of deficit or surplus can be implemented and the resulting mechanisms achieve the above bound. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.