Pension Policy and the Value of Corporate‐Level Investment
通过蒙特卡洛模拟，研究了养老金政策如何影响企业投资对公司和各类债权人的价值，发现养老金资产缺乏多样化会损害股东利益，而《2006年养老金保护法案》规定的资金水平改善能减少这种财富转移。
We examine how pension policy affects the value of corporate‐level investment to the firm and its various claimants using Monte Carlo simulation. Shareholders lose the greatest amount of project value to the pension plan when it is undiversified across asset classes. Improved funding levels mandated by the provisions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 generally reduce those wealth transfers. Thus, mitigation of the overhang effect joins the reduction of financial distress costs as a motivation for holding both stocks and bonds in the pension fund .