Targeting with Agents
研究了当执行扶贫的官员可能腐败时，如何设计代理家计调查。发现增加贫困指标可能因统计准确性与可执行性之间的权衡而恶化瞄准效果，并用印度贫困线以下家庭卡分配数据验证了该权衡。
Targeting assistance to the poor is a central problem in development. We study the problem of designing a proxy means test when the implementing agent is corruptible. Conditioning on more poverty indicators may worsen targeting in this environment because of a novel tradeoff between statistical accuracy and enforceability. We then test necessary conditions for this tradeoff using data on Below Poverty Line card allocation in India. Less eligible households pay larger bribes and are less likely to obtain cards, but widespread rule violations yield a de facto allocation much less progressive than the de jure one. Enforceability appears to matter.