Competition and innovation: an experimental investigation
通过实验研究竞争强度对企业工艺创新投资的影响，发现增加企业数量会减少投资，而从古诺竞争转向伯特兰竞争则会增加投资，与理论预测部分相反。
Abstract The paper analyzes the effects of more intense competition on firms’ investments in process innovations. More intense competition corresponds to an increase in the number of firms or a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition. We carry out experiments for two-stage games, where R&D investment choices are followed by product market competition. An increase in the number of firms from two to four reduces investments, whereas a switch from Cournot to Bertrand increases investments, even though theory predicts a negative effect in the four-player case. The results arise both in treatments in which both stages are implemented and in treatments in which only one stage is implemented. However, the positive effect of moving from Cournot to Bertrand competition is more pronounced in the former case.