When Does Communication Improve Coordination?
研究了无经验玩家在对称2×2博弈中，事前无成本沟通对协调的影响。发现单向沟通能微弱增加纳什均衡协调，但平均收益有时下降；双向沟通在某些博弈中改善收益，在另一些中则有害。
We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2×2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes decrease. Two-way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others. Moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 × 2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination.