Consumption Taxes and Economic Efficiency with Idiosyncratic Wage Shocks
在一个异质性主体代际交叠模型中考察了从累进所得税转向单一消费税的税制改革，发现当工资冲击不可保险时，改革会降低效率，尽管国民财富和产出增加，这主要是因为累进税制提供的代内风险分担功能丧失。
Fundamental tax reform is examined in an overlapping‐generations model in which heterogeneous agents face idiosyncratic wage shocks and longevity uncertainty. A progressive income tax is replaced with a flat consumption tax. If idiosyncratic wage shocks are insurable (i.e., no risk), this reform improves (interim) efficiency, a result consistent with the previous literature. But if, more realistically, wage shocks are uninsurable, this reform reduces efficiency, even though national wealth and output increase over the entire transition path. This efficiency loss, in large part, stems from reduced intragenerational risk sharing that was previously provided by the progressive tax system.