The Choquet Bargaining Solutions
用公理化方法研究谈判解，要求谈判解能被在每个秩排序子集上线性的社会福利函数（即Choquet积分）合理化，并给出了Choquet谈判解的完整刻画，同时作为推论得到了广义Gini谈判解的刻画。
We axiomatically investigate the problem of rationalizing bargaining solutions by social welfare functions that are linear in every rank-ordered subset of Rn+ . Such functions, the so-called Choquet integrals, have been widely used in the theories of collective and individual choice. We refer to bargaining solutions that can be rationalized by Choquet integrals as Choquet bargaining solutions. Our main result is a complete characterization of Choquet bargaining solutions. As a corollary of our main result, we also obtain a characterization of the generalized Gini bargaining solutions introduced by Blackorby et al. (1994, Econometrica62, 1161–1178). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, C78.