Power‐Sharing in Monetary Policy Committees: Evidence from the United Kingdom and Sweden
研究了货币政策委员会内部成员间的权力分享，发现英国央行行长对其他成员影响小，而瑞典央行行长影响大。
Committees may make better monetary policy decisions than individuals; however, the benefits of group decision making could be lost if committee members cede power to a chairman. We develop an econometric model to describe intracommittee power‐sharing across members. Estimation of the model permits us to classify monetary policy committees into the typology developed by Blinder ( , ). We estimate our model for the United Kingdom's Bank of England (BOE) and Sweden's Riksbank. Results for the BOE suggest that the Governor has little influence over other committee members, while those for the Riksbank indicate that the Governor is highly influential.