Bank runs: Liquidity costs and investment distortions
扩展了Diamond和Dybvig的金融中介模型，研究银行挤兑发生的条件，并分析银行如何通过设计存款合同和投资决策来应对挤兑风险，以平衡风险与预期收益。
In this paper we extend the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of intermediation to study further the conditions under which bank runs can occur and to consider how private parties might adjust to the existence of bank-run equilibria. We provide weaker necessary conditions for runs. We then characterize how banks respond to the possibility of runs in their design of deposit contracts and investment decisions. Banks might choose to offer contracts that prevent runs, but under some conditions the (second) best contracts will involve accepting some risk of runs in order to achieve higher expected returns from their investments.