Fixed fees and physician‐induced demand: A panel data study on French physicians
利用1979-1993年4500名法国自雇医生的面板数据，检验医生诱导需求是否存在，发现医生面对医生人口比上升时咨询次数微降，但通过增加每次就诊的服务量来弥补。
This paper investigates on the existence of physician-induced demand (PID) for French physicians. The test is carried out for GPs and specialists, using a representative sample of 4500 French self-employed physicians over the 1979-1993 period. These physicians receive a fee-for-services (FFS) payment and fees are controlled. The panel structure of our data allows us to take into account unobserved heterogeneity related to the characteristics of physicians and their patients. We use generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators in order to obtain consistent and efficient estimates. We show that physicians experience a decline of the number of consultations when they face an increase in the physician:population ratio. However this decrease is very slight. In addition, physicians counterbalance the fall in the number of consultations by an increase in the volume of care delivered in each encounter. Econometric results give a strong support for the existence of PID in the French system for ambulatory care.