Terms-of-Trade Uncertainty, Incomplete Markets and Unemployment
研究一个两部门小型开放经济体在贸易条件冲击下，风险中性企业家通过隐性合同为风险规避工人提供收入保险，分析合同特征及其对就业、工资和效用的影响，并证明该均衡在约束条件下是帕累托最优的。
This paper examines a two-sector small open economy that is subject to shocks in its terms-of-trade. Risk-neutral entrepreneurs use implicit contracts to insure risk-averse workers against fluctuations in their income. The characteristics of these contracts are examined within a general framework and the implications for employment, wages, and utility of different realizations of relative prices are analyzed. The implicit contract equilibrium is shown to be constrained Pareto optimal when the social planner is unable to provide income directly to unemployed workers. Copyright 1992 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.