Optimal auction design in two‐sided markets
研究了在线广告市场中，平台如何设计拍卖机制以最大化长期利润，其中点击率取决于用户对平台选择相关广告商的预期。最优机制是结合广告商支付意愿和用户相关性的评分拍卖，通过交叉补贴平衡租金提取和点击量。
A key feature of online markets for advertising (e.g., sponsored links) is that clicking rates depend on the searchers' expectations that the platform selects relevant advertisers. This article studies auction design by a platform that maximizes profits in the long run, where clicking rates are mechanism dependent. In line with the practice of the major search engines, the revenue‐maximizing mechanism is a scoring auction that combines the willingness to pay and the relevance to searchers of advertisers. By trading off rent extraction and clicking volume, this mechanism works as a cross‐subsidization device between searchers and advertisers.