遵循新的补贴规则:资本补贴作为部门补贴的替代品

Playing by the new subsidy rules: capital subsidies as substitutes for sectoral subsidies

Journal of International Economics · 1997
被引 7
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

在一个存在递增回报部门和外资的小型开放经济中,当最优生产计划是专业化于产生外部性的活动时,资本补贴可以替代部门特定补贴来实现最优,其效果取决于生产模式和外资占比。

Abstract

In a small, open economy characterized by an increasing-returns sector and foreign-owned capital, a sector-specific instrument generally is needed to achieve the optimum. A capital subsidy alone can be used for decentralization, however, when the optimal production plan is specialization in the externality-generating activity. The effect of a capital subsidy on home income and its distribution depends on the pattern of production and the share of domestic capital that is foreign owned. In a diversified economy, a subsidy benefits capital owners, harms labor and raises national income only if foreign capital ownership is sufficiently small. In a specialized economy, a subsidy may raise national income even if all domestic capital is foreign owned and, if it does, both labor and capital owners gain. Thus, a capital subsidy may be an attractive replacement for sector-specific subsidies proscribed by international agreements.

资本补贴部门补贴外国资本国民收入