THE CORE OF A SPATIAL PRICE EQUILIBRIUM GAME*
从经典空间价格均衡模型出发，定义了生产者博弈的核心，阐述了核心非空的条件，并解决了特征函数的定义与计算问题，最后以美国东部煤炭市场为例展示理论结果的应用。
ABSTRACT This paper presents a critical appraisal of the use of the core as a solution concept for games involving spatially separated producers. Starting from the classical Samuelson/Takayama‐Judge spatial price equilibrium model, the core of a game between the producers of commodities in this economy is defined, the conditions ensuring the nonemptiness of the core are stated, and the problems surrounding the definition and computation of the characteristic function are addressed. An application to the eastern United States’coal market is then presented in order to illustrate the usefulness of the theoretical and algorithmic results of this paper.