Structuring Deposit Insurance for a United Europe
分析在统一欧洲推行统一存款保险方案的困难，通过一般均衡模型研究保费、税收与社会风险厌恶的关系，发现统一保险体系可能不可行，需要密切的宏观经济政策协调。
This paper analyses the difficulties associated with imposing a unified deposit insurance scheme in a unified Europe. Specifically, it investigates the determinants of optimal deposit insurance in light of the Commission's 1994 decision requiring mandatory minimum coverage and encouraging a single unified deposit insurance structure. Issues of deposit insurance premiums and tax burden are analysed in the context of a general equilibrium‐type model. The results indicate that taxes, the optimal degree of deposit insurance, and societal risk aversion are all interrelated in such a structure. Therefore, a common insurance system may not be feasible nor appropriate for a first best solution; co‐ordination and even unified taxation may be necessary. At the minimum, exceedingly close macroeconomic policy co‐ordination will be necessary for the single market for financial services to come to fruition and achieve stability.