A Theory of Outsourcing and Wage Decline
构建了一个外包理论，核心是生产要素攫取租金的能力。当劳动具有垄断力量而资本没有时，劳动密集型任务会从资本密集型任务中分离到不同企业。资本密集型国家开放贸易或降低外包摩擦会降低劳动租金。
This paper develops a theory of outsourcing in which the circumstances under which factors of production can grab rents play the leading role. One factor has monopoly power (call this labor) while a second factor does not (call this capital). There are two kinds of production tasks: labor-intensive and capital-intensive. We show that if frictions limiting outsourcing are not too large, in equilibrium labor-intensive tasks are separated from capital-intensive tasks into distinct firms. When a capital-intensive country is opened to free trade, outsourcing increases and labor rents decline. A decrease in outsourcing frictions lowers labor rents.