Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives
提出联邦制是国家可信地维护市场激励的治理方案，通过信息与权力下放及辖区间竞争来防止政府损害经济成功或救助失败，并指出某些联邦制具有自我维持特性。
The authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism. Their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives. Market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures. The salient features of federalism--decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition--help provide credible commitment or these purposes. In addition, the authors suggest that some federalism are self-sustaining.