BANK RUNS: DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS*
扩展了Diamond-Dybvig模型，分析存款保险在银行道德风险和储户监督下的成本与收益，发现单独完全存款保险无法实现最优结果，但附加资本要求可恢复最优配置。
Diamond and Dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs. We extend the Diamond–Dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. We find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first‐best outcome: depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects. However, an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first‐best allocation.