Business unit innovation and the structure of executive compensation
研究事业部CEO的薪酬结构是否与部门后续创新活动相关，以及薪酬结构是否取决于预期的创新机会。采用联立方程模型，发现长期薪酬占比与未来创新正相关，但与预期创新机会无关。
We examine whether the structure of compensation for the divisional CEO is related to subsequent innovative activity within the division, and whether the divisional CEO's compensation is structured as a function of the expected innovation opportunity set facing the division. Both the expected innovation opportunity set and the divisional executive's compensation contract are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equation approach. We find modest evidence that the proportion of total compensation tied to long-term components has a positive relation with future innovation, but no evidence that this proportion has a positive relation with the expected innovation opportunity set.