Financially Constrained Entry in a Game with Incomplete Information
分析了一个垄断者与潜在进入者之间的博弈，其中进入者面临财务约束且垄断者不确定进入者是否愿意打持久价格战。研究发现存在唯一完美均衡，进入有时会发生，并可能引发掠夺性价格战。
In an earlier paper we presented an entry game with a monopolist and a potential entrant facing financial constraints in which the unique perfect equilibrium involved no entry. Here we consider a one-sided, incomplete information variant of the game in which the monopolist allows for the possibility that the entrant is committed to endure a price war to the limit of his capability. We find a unique sequentially perfect equilibrium in which entry sometimes occurs. When it does, predatory price wars may result, with the incumbent sometimes driving out the entrant but other times eventually abandoning the fight.