Political structure, taxes, and trade
用博弈论分析市场链条的政治组织如何影响税收和贸易量，发现独立辖区的非合作税收政策会产生损害贸易的外部性，而市场垄断或合作税收策略能内部化这些成本，同时提高贸易量和税收收入。
This paper examines the effects of the political organization of a chain of markets on the level of taxes and the volume of trade. Using a game-theoretic approach we note that, under certain demand stuructures, noncooperative tax policies implemented by independent jurisdictions entail externalities detrimental to trade. We show that the monoplization of the chain of markets (or the implementation of cooperative tax strategies), by internalizing the costs associated with these externalities, increases the volume of trade and the tax revenues simultaneously.