Informal insurance in renewable resource harvesting
构建了一个一般均衡模型，研究少量资源使用者之间分享部分渔获的非正式保险合约，发现保险保费增加会降低劳动投入效率，但资源存量上升可缓解这种低效，存在次优分享水平。
A general equilibrium model is presented where a small number of resource users share part of their harvests with each other. As the productivity of resource harvest is stochastic, the sharing rule can be interpreted as an informal insurance contract. As individual labour inputs are unobservable, an exogenous increase in the insurance premium causes individuals to expend less effort on harvesting. However, the resulting inefficiency is reduced by an increase in the expected long‐run level of the resource stock. A second‐best efficient level of sharing exists, which is positive but smaller than the first‐best level if the resource stock per capita is small.