Farm Debt, Default, and Foreclosure: An Economic Rationale for Policy Action
指出，由于市场失灵和不完美，减少或消除违约和止赎威胁的农业项目可能带来经济效益，并构建了负债企业的生产模型和总量模型，以识别向负债农民转移支付项目的成本和收益。
Abstract Economic analysis of farm programs typically focusses on economic costs. Here we show that, because of market failures and imperfections, there are possible economic benefits to be derived from programs which reduce or eliminate the threat of default and foreclosure. A production model of an indebted firm is developed and serves as a basis for an aggregate model which identifies possible costs and benefits from a program of transfers to indebted farmers. The challenge facing policy makers is to design programs which capture the benefits of reducing the probability of default while minimizing perverse incentive effects of such programs.