Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining
研究发现，当法庭审判或仲裁作为解决谈判僵局的机制时，第三方干预的成本和风险本应促进和解，但实证表明僵局和低效和解在法律系统和合同谈判中很常见，例如石棉诉讼中每花费1美元只有37美分落入原告手中。
When court trials (or arbitration) are the \nmechanisms for resolving bargaining impasses, \nthe costs and risks associated with \nthird-party intervention should motivate \nsettlement (Henry Farber and Harry Katz, \n1979). However, empirical evidence suggests \nthat impasses and inefficient settlements are \ncommon in the legal system and in contract \nnegotiations. For example, one study of asbestos \nsuits found that only 37 cents of every dollar \nspent by both sides end up in the plaintiffs' \nhands (James Kakalik et al., 1983).