Efficiency in Hierarchies: Implementing the First-Best Solution by Sequential Actions
研究一个委托人和两个代理人的企业模型，代理人行动不可观测（道德风险）。当代理人序贯行动时，通过适当设计激励方案可实现最优行动，结果依赖于序贯博弈和行动对产出的特定影响。
A model of a firm with one principal and two agents is considered. The actions of the agents are not observed by the principal; hence there is moral hazard. It is shown that when the agents act sequentially-that is, agent 2 takes his action conditional upon agent I 's choicethe first-best actions can be implemented by a suitable choice of the incentive schemes given to the two agents. The result relies both on the sequential nature of the game and on the particular specification of the effect that the agents' actions have on output. Several extensions and applications of the framework are suggested. In particular, it is shown that the analysis generalizes to the case of more than two agents.