OUTPUT‐EXPANDING COLLUSION IN THE PRESENCE OF A COMPETITIVE FRINGE*
研究了在需求冲击下，少数大厂商与众多小供应商竞争时，大厂商的合谋协议不仅可能带来产出收缩，还可能在繁荣期导致产出扩张，并分析了维持合谋的时机。
Following the structure of many commodity markets, we consider a few large firms and a competitive fringe of many small suppliers choosing quantities in an infinite‐horizon setting subject to demand shocks. We show that a collusive agreement among the large firms may not only bring an output contraction but also an output expansion (relative to the non‐collusive output level). The latter occurs during booms and is due to the strategic substitutability of quantities. We also find that the time at which maximal collusion is most difficult to sustain can be either at booms or recessions. The international copper cartel of 1935–39 is used to illustrate some of our results.