Inefficiency of Subgame Optimal Entry Regulation
通过一个两期三人进入博弈模型，指出旨在防止过度进入的政府管制反而会引发在位者的策略性行为，导致比无干预更差的社会结果，说明进入管制在子博弈中虽最优但全局低效。
The literature on excess entry shows that the free-entry equilibrium number of firms may be greater than is socially optimal, and proposes government entry regulation as a remedy. This article tries to show that such a policy recommendation is misleading. A two-period, three-person entry game model, which explicitly includes second-best government, shows that entry regulation aimed at preventing excess entry actually induces the incumbent to behave strategically against the government and makes the final outcome socially suboptimal compared to cases in which there is no government intervention. Entry regulation is subgame optimal; however, it is globally suboptimal.