Labor Contracts under Asymmetric Information when Workers are Free to Quit
研究工人辞职能力如何影响企业与工人之间的劳动合同绩效，发现工人离职自由会降低总福利，但能减少因信息不对称导致的就业扭曲，且就业扭曲随工人锁定效应增强而增大。
This paper examines the impact of workers' ability to quit on the performance of labor contracts between workers and privately informed firms. While the need to induce workers to remain with the firm necessarily lowers total welfare, the effect on employment levels is to reduce the magnitude of the inefficiency due to asymmetric information, whether this inefficiency is under- or overemployment. The model predicts that employment distortions increase with the strength of lock-in effects on workers, a prediction which contrasts with the results of efficiency wage models and which may help in empirical testing of labor contract theory.