Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric
利用法国国债拍卖数据，估计了考虑投标人不对称和供给不确定性的份额拍卖模型的结构参数，发现投标人间存在信息不对称和风险厌恶不对称，反事实分析表明从歧视性拍卖转向统一价格拍卖对法国财政部和参与者都有利。
Abstract The structural parameters of a share‐auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders, as well as supply uncertainty, are estimated with a sample of French Treasury auctions. We find evidence of both informational and risk aversion asymmetries across bidders. A counter‐factual analysis also suggests that, in the context of the French Treasury auctions, a shift from the discriminatory to the uniform‐price format would simultaneously benefit the French Treasury and the auctions' participants. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.