Can Price Competition Dominate Market Segmentation?
分析了双寡头在选址定价两阶段博弈中开设多家门店的动机，发现均衡时企业不会开第二家店，因为多店会加剧价格竞争，使市场分割策略失去吸引力。
This note analyzes duopoly competition in a two stage (location-price) game, while allowing each f irm to establish a couple of outlets. Both the circle and the line mo del of spatial competition are considered. The main result is clear-c ut: in equilibrium neither firm will take up the opportunity of openi ng two stores. This is a warning that market segmentation, i.e., comp etition from multiple outlets, might not be attractive at all, becaus e it entails more intense price competition. Copyright 1988 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.