The R&D Incentives of Industry Leaders
构建模型解释行业领导者为何大量投入研发，并分析其福利影响。研究发现，当领导者具有研发成本优势时，政府应补贴所有企业的研发支出、补贴领导者的生产支出，并对新领导者的利润征税；若无干预，市场会产生过多的创造性破坏。
This paper presents a model to explain why industry leader firms often devote substantial resources to R&D activities and explores the welfare implications of this investment. The key new assumption is that industry leaders can improve their own products more easily than can other firms. When industry leaders have R&D cost advantages, it is optimal for the government to subsidize the R&D expenditures of all firms, subsidize the production expenditures of industry leaders, and tax the profits of new industry leaders. Without government intervention, market forces generate too much creative destruction.