If You Cannot Get Your Friends Elected, Lobby Your Enemies
在公民候选人模型中引入竞选捐款，发现游说团体既资助立场一致的候选人竞选，也在其落选后向胜选的反对派输送资源以换取政策妥协，但从不向自己资助的胜选者进行事后转移。
We incorporate campaign contributions in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying of Felli and Merlo (2006). In equilibrium, lobbies contribute to the electoral campaign of candidates whose policy preferences are aligned with their own. In the event that their preferred candidate does not win the election, lobbies also transfer resources to elected politicians with opposed preferences to induce policy compromise. On the other hand, lobbies never make post electoral transfers to winning candidates whose electoral campaign they supported.