Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs
利用高速公路铺路合同数据，研究发现合同重新谈判带来显著适应成本，竞标者会策略性应对合同不完全性，且适应成本占中标价的7.5%-14%，远大于私人信息和市场势力带来的加价。
Procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution. Using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs are an important determinant of their bids. A structural empirical model compares adaptation costs to bidder markups and shows that adaptation costs account for 7.5–14 percent of the winning bid. Markups from private information and market power, the focus of much of the auctions literature, are much smaller by comparison. Implications for government procurement are discussed.