Performance Implications of IJV Boards: A Contingency Perspective
研究了董事会参与对国际合资企业绩效的影响，发现对于功能范围广、母公司市场重叠度高的复杂合作，董事会参与能提升绩效。
Abstract This study draws from the corporate governance literature to investigate the implications of board involvement for international joint ventures ( IJVs ). We extend recent corporate governance research on the value of board involvement by investigating unique sources of complexity related to the nature of the IJV . We argue and find that board involvement can enhance the performance of IJVs , particularly for collaborations that are complex in nature due to their broad functional scope as well the level of market overlap between IJV parents. We complement recent research on joint venture control that has focused on the antecedents and types of control, as well as studies on formal (e.g. contractual safeguards and monitoring) and informal governance mechanisms (e.g. trust) by providing empirical evidence that IJV board involvement is valuable when directors undertake their control and coordination responsibilities. We advance corporate governance research by providing evidence that joint ventures possess several unique characteristics that shape the value of board involvement, thereby showing that applications of corporate governance theory to joint ventures are useful, but should be made with care.