Building an incentive-compatible safety net
指出银行安全网本为稳定金融系统，却因政府保护债务而鼓励银行过度冒险，并探讨了通过要求银行维持次级债务比例和限制政府注资来消除道德风险的改革方案。
Bank safety nets, originally proposed as a means of stabilizing financial systems, have become an important destabilizing influence. Government protection of bank debts encourages banks to undertake excessive risk, particularly in response to adverse shocks to asset values. Reforms that would remove the destabilizing moral hazard consequences of government protection are considered, both from the perspective of economic desirability and political feasibility. Requiring banks to maintain a minimal proportion of subordinated debt finance, and restricting the means by which government recapitalization of insolvent banks occurs are the central features of promising reforms to the safety net.