Rotating Savings and Credit Associations When Participants are Risk Averse*
建模了风险厌恶参与者面临私人收入冲击时的轮转储蓄与信贷协会（Rosca），发现竞标型Rosca在时间风险厌恶弱于静态风险厌恶时有利，其支付方案促进信息不对称下的风险分担，且同质群体同时运行多个竞标型Rosca的风险分担效果与线性风险分担合同相当，但更易执行。
We model rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) among risk‐averse participants who experience privately observed income shocks. A random Rosca is not advantageous, whereas a bidding Rosca is if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion. The payoff scheme of a bidding Rosca facilitates risk sharing in the presence of information asymmetries. The risk‐sharing performance of a simple arrangement where a group of homogenous individuals runs several bidding Roscas simultaneously is as good as that of a linear risk‐sharing contract, and is more enforceable because it carries a fixed rather than a variable contribution.