Peddling Influence through Intermediaries
研究有偏见的发送者如何通过中间人与决策者沟通，发现偏见发送者和中间人的报告真实性是战略互补的，且偏见发送者使用中间人的意愿取决于其声誉关注程度。
A sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries. In this model, an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully, while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns. I show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary's reporting truthfulness are strategic complements. The biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low, but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate. Moreover, the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased.