The Government As Venture Capitalist: Organisational Structure and Contract Design in Germany's Privatisation Process
研究德国私有化过程中，如何通过设立独立机构和外包合同来增强政府承诺的可信度，从而抵御政治和社会反对，并吸引私营部门人才，政府在此过程中扮演了类似风险投资家的角色。
This paper examines the role that organisation structure and contract design played in resolving economic and political problems that arose during Germany's privatisation process. We find that German officials structured organizations and contracts in a way that made credible the government's commitment to rapid privatisation. This credibility served to protect the process from political and social opposition. In addition, it enabled Germany to attract talented private sector managers to its privatisation effort. This began with the establishment of an independent privatisation agency, the Treuhand. It culminated with the creation of another set of independent organisations called Management KGs, to which the Treuhand outsourced part of its restructuring, management and privatisation work. The Treuhand provided funding to this effort, thus serving as a kind of venture capitalist.