Strategic Decision-Making with Information and Extraction Externalities: A Structural Model of the MultiStage Investment Timing Game in Offshore Petroleum Production
研究了石油公司在勘探和开发投资时机决策中，因信息外部性和开采外部性导致的战略互动，通过结构计量模型估计发现，在小块土地上存在显著的战略互动，而在大块土地上则没有。
Abstract When individual petroleum-producing firms make their exploration and development investment timing decisions, positive information externalities and negative extraction externalities may lead them to interact strategically with their neighbors. This paper examines whether these inefficient strategic interactions take place by estimating a structural econometric model of the firms' multi-stage investment timing game. Results show that firms interact strategically on small tracts but not on large tracts. For small tracts, having a neighboring tract explored reduces real profits by about $26 million, while having a neighboring tract developed raises real profits by about $3.5 million.