Sense and Nonsense about Depreciation
分析折旧政策对企业利润和投资的影响，指出除100%核销外，任何折旧计划都构成对资本的税收，从而抑制投资、导致效率低下，并反驳了加速折旧是补贴的普遍误解。
In recent years, much controversy has surrounded the treatment of depreciation in calculating corporate profits. For example, consumer advocates have claimed that the public is being cheated when utility rates are not reduced for the deferred caused by accelerated depreciation. As these are taxes that are not paid, presumably consumers should not bear such a fictitious burden in the form of higher utility rates. In general, it is widely believed that allowing accelerated depreciation is a to businesses, to the extent that claimed depreciation exceeds the actual deterioration of the assets. As my analysis will prove, any depreciation schedule other than a 100% write-off (i.e., expensing investments in plant and equipment) constitutes a tax on capital. As a consequence, investment in capital goods is discouraged, inefficient technology is employed, and the economy loses (possibly substantial amounts of) positive net present value projects. In view of the attention given to depreciation policy, it is surprising that the true nature of depreciation has not been widely recognized. Although the gist of my analysis has already appeared in scholarly literature since at least 1963 (see [11] and [12], for example), public debate on further accelerating depreciation still erroneously assumes that accelerated depreciation is a subsidy. It may be only semantics, but in a politicized economy there is a difference between granting a subsidy and ameliorating a penalty. Consider this statement by a distinguished economist and former policy maker: