Labor Contracts with Voluntary Quits
研究风险中性企业与风险厌恶工人之间的劳动合同，工人通过有成本的在职搜索了解外部工资机会，分析了确定性工资和随机性工资下的最优合同设计，以及搜索努力不可观测时的影响。
This paper considers labor contracts between the risk-neutral firm and risk-averse workers with heterogeneous outside opportunities (alternative wages), which become known to the worker after a costly on-the-job search. In the case of a deterministic alternative wage, self-selection over a menu of contract wages would achieve the first-best contract. If the alternative wages are stochastic, the second-best contract emerges as a trade-off between productive efficiency and risk sharing. Workers who voluntarily search are fewer, and workers who search are less likely to quit. If the search effort is not monitored, even fewer workers search. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.