Management Forecast Accuracy and CEO Turnover
研究管理层预测误差与CEO更替的关系，发现当公司业绩差时，预测误差越大CEO更替概率越高，且这种关系在权力较小的CEO中更显著。
ABSTRACT We investigate whether management forecast accuracy provides a signal regarding CEOs' ability to anticipate and respond to future events by examining the relation between management forecast errors and CEO turnover. We find that the probability of CEO turnover is positively related to the magnitude of absolute forecast errors when firm performance is poor and that this positive relation holds for both positive and negative forecast errors. In addition, we find that the positive relation between CEO turnover and the absolute forecast errors is concentrated in the sample of less entrenched CEOs. Our findings indicate that boards of directors use management forecast accuracy as a signal of CEOs' managerial ability and that managers bear a cost for issuing inaccurate forecasts.