Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement
研究代理人报酬不基于委托人目标时的激励合同特征，指出即使代理人风险中性，基于此类绩效衡量的合同通常也无法实现最优激励，并分析了最优合同形式与效率取决于绩效衡量与委托人目标的关系。
This paper examines the characteristics of incentive contracts in which the agent's payoff is not based on the principal's objective. The author shows that contracts based on such performance measures will not, in general, provide first-best incentives, even when the agent is risk neutral. The form of the optimal contract and the efficiency of this contract depend on the relationship between the performance measure used and the principal's objective. The model provides a simple and intuitive statistical measure. Applications to various incentive contracting situations, including the "gaming" of performance measures, the use of revenue-based sales commissions, and relative performance evaluation, are presented. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.