Deposit Insurance, Banking Crises, and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Deposit Flows and Rates
利用俄罗斯数据，通过自然实验检验存款保险对市场纪律的直接影响，发现存款保险显著降低了家庭存款对银行资本状况的敏感性，并削弱了危机对市场纪律的唤醒效应。
Using evidence from Russia, we carry out what we believe to be the literature's cleanest test of the direct impact of deposit insurance on market discipline and study the combined effect of a banking crisis and deposit insurance on market discipline. We employ a difference‐in‐difference estimator to isolate the change in the behavior of a newly insured group (i.e., households) relative to an uninsured “control” group (i.e., firms). The sensitivity of households to bank capitalization diminishes markedly after the introduction of deposit insurance. The traditional wake‐up call effect of a crisis is muted by this numbing effect of deposit insurance.