Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition
定义了非原子博弈作为有限参与者博弈序列极限的条件，并证明了当有限博弈均衡收敛时，其极限是连续博弈的均衡，类似于埃奇沃思猜想在核心理论中的结果。
The anonymous interaction of large numbers of economic agents is a kind of noncooperative situation which is markedly different from small-numbers strategic conflict. The nonatomic game has been introduced as a model for these many-agent situations. This paper contains a precise definition of what it means for a nonatomic game to be the limit of a sequence of finite-player games, and a theorem which states when the limit of equilibria of finite-player games will be an equilibrium of the nonatomic limit game. This is analogous to theorems prompted by Edgeworth's conjecture in core theory.