Secrecy versus patenting
构建了一个考虑多重独立发现的均衡搜索模型，区分创新与想法，将专利视为受保密选择约束的概率性产权，发现专利制度能同时促进创新、信息披露和福利，且最优专利的保护力度常弱于保密，其主要功能是信息传播而非奖励创新成本。
We develop an equilibrium search model of innovation with the possibility of multiple independent discovery. We distinguish innovations from ideas, and we view patents as probabilistic property rights that are constrained by the innovators' option to keep the innovation secret. We find that the patent system can simultaneously stimulate innovation, information disclosure and welfare. An optimal patent may provide more or less protection than secrecy, and in many cases, it provides less, suggesting that its main function is information spreading rather than rewarding the costs of the innovative activity.