A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
为特征函数形式的可转移效用合作博弈定义了一个新解概念，在个体相信平等是理想社会目标但私人偏好导致自私行为的前提下，要求解结果满足类似核心的参与约束，并从满足该约束的支付集中选择洛伦兹最大元素。
We define a new solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games in characteristic function form, in a framework where individuals believe in equality as a desirable social goal, although private preferences dictate selfish behavior. This latter aspect implies that the solution outcome(s) must satisfy core-like participation constraints while the concern for equality entails choice of Lorenz maximal elements from within the set of payoffs satisfying the participation constraints