Efficiency of Decoupled Farm Programs Under Distortionary Taxation
研究在无法使用一次性总付税时，脱钩农业补贴因需筹集政府收入而造成的福利损失，并证明即使存在扭曲性税收，脱钩仍优于关税保护，且大国的最优关税与扭曲性税收对农民转移支付的影响可分离。
Abstract When lump‐sum taxation is not feasible, decoupled transfers to farmers (which require raising government revenue) will entail welfare loss somewhere in the economy. Assuming the government's objective is to assure a given welfare level for farmers, we show that when decoupling is possible, free trade is always superior to some tariff protection for a small country, even under distortionary taxation. As expected, for a large country there is scope for an optimal tariff policy that improves the terms of trade. However, we show a separation between the exercise of market power through an optimal tariff, and the interaction of distortionary taxation with transfers to farmers. We conclude that decoupling is usually desirable, even in a distorted economy in which lump‐sum taxation is not feasible.