Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids
研究收购要约公告导致目标公司股价上涨的现象，探讨收购方是否可能为高价卖出持股而发起虚假收购，分析操纵行为对股价、收购活动及股东福利的影响。
The announcement of a takeover bid causes significant increases in the target's stock price, but the possibility that a bid is motivated to cause this increase so that the bidder can sell his holdings has not been studied. We show that stock price manipulation lowers the prebid stock price. Furthermore, if there is little takeover activity, manipulation increases takeover bids and prevents some efficient takeovers. In this case, stockholders prefer to ban it. However, if there is a high level of takeover activity, serious bidders are better off and social surplus is increased by the possibility of manipulation. In this case, stockholders may oppose a ban.