Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions
通过实验发现，在份额拍卖中，投标人之间的非约束性事前沟通会促使统一价格拍卖中采用合谋策略，导致清算价格和拍卖方收益低于歧视性拍卖，暗示国债统一价格拍卖可能比现行歧视性拍卖收入更低。
We provide experimental evidence that nonbinding preplay communication between bidders in auctions of shares facilitates the adoption of equilibrium strategies: collusive strategies in uniform-price auctions, and the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in discriminatory auctions. When communication between bidders is introduced, clearing prices and auctioneer profits in uniform-price auctions fall below those observed in discriminatory auctions. This evidence suggests that uniform-price auctions of Treasury securities may result in lower revenues than the currently employed discriminatory procedure.